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PARADE ORDINANCES AND PRIOR RESTRAINTS
The recent violent racial strife in our country has caused municipal
officials to intensify their search for methods of preventing confrontation
between antagonistic parties. One of these methods involves the imple-
mentation of laws requiring licensing of parades, marches or public
gatherings before they occur. Ordinances of this type provide the mu-
nicipality with advance information so that traffic may be rerouted, es-
corts can be supplied and community disruption can be minimized.1
However such statutes present a difficult constitutional problem involv-
ing prior restraints on freedom of speech.'
The Supreme Court has found prior restraints on freedom of the
press unconstitutional 3 but has upheld some licensing statutes which were
prior restraints on freedom of speech in public places,4 thus drawing a
distinction between "pure speech" and "speech plus."5 The Court recog-
nizes the validity of licensing statutes which regulate in a general and
non-discriminatory manner the time, location, and form of the demon-
stration with a view only to controlling the use of the streets to insure
free movement of traffic.' On the other hand the Court has been con-
cerned with the lack of standards and procedural safeguards in the li-
censing statutes which result in the licensor's unlimited power to censor
any views, thus denying individuals equal protection of the law or es-
tablishing an invalid prior restraint.7  Recent obscenity decisions also in-
dicate that the Court approaches cases concerning prior restraints on
ICox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). Some feared that the effect of con-
versation relied on by the court in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) between the protesters
and municipal officials would inhibit further pre-march arrangements between protesters and
the municipality. Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L REv.
177, 218-19 (1966).
2 "[-Liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution,
has meant, principally ... immunity from previous restraints or censorship." Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-251 (1936)
[Historic Development]; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) [Extended to leaflet dis-
tribution].
SNear v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936).
4 COx v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949);
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). Justice Jackson proposes that written words
are less likely to incite mass action than spoken words which directly arouse emotions. Kunz v.
New York, 340 U.S. 290, 307 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
5 "Governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and
available for movement." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-555 (1965). ". . . the First and
Fourteenth Amendment [do not] afford the same kind of freedom to those who would commu-
nicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways as
these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech." Id. at 555.
6 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
576 (1941); Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 328 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
7 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951); Saa v. New York, 334 U.S 558, 560 (1948).
freedom of expression with a presumption against their validity.' In or-
der to be saved such a licensing statute must contain procedural safe-
guards which insure against the dangers of censorship. The Court's
reference to obscenity cases in political speech cases and the similar need
for expeditious judicial review'0 in both situations indicate that procedural
safeguards, together with proper delineation of subject matter and defi-
nite standards, may be requisites of a constitutional demonstration li-
censing statute. This article will discuss the procedural safeguards and
the standards of such a statute.
Though the First Amendment speaks in absolute terms, "Congress
shall make no laws .. .abridging the freedom of speech," the Court has
employed a balancing test in deciding the constitutionality of free speech
convictions under breach of the peace statutes. "[Fjreedom of speech
. .. is . . .protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown
likely to produce a dear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that arises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."'1  The
Court dealing specifically with a licensing statute posed the question as
whether "[the) control [of traffic by the licensorl is exerted so as not to
deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportu-
nities ... for the discussion of public questions immemorially associated
with resort to public places."' 2  The Court approved a statute which
granted the applicant a right to a license "if after a required investiga-
tion it was found that the convenience of the public in the use of the
streets would not thereby be unduly disturbed, upon such conditions or
changes in time, place and manner as would avoid disturbance."'13 The
individual's right to express himself in public seems to be competing with
the public's right to be free of disturbance in their travel over the public
highways and sidewalks. Since these statutes may affect First Amend-
ment rights and may be prior restraints, which carry a presumption against
their validity, the Court is obligated to examine the facts in each case to
establish whether a federal right has been infringed. 4 The presumption
8 Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,
57 (1965).
9 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
30 Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968) [Herein-
after cited as Carroll v. Princess Anne]; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 155 n. 4
(1969) (Harlan concurring), 394 U.S. 147, 157 (1969). See Poulus v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395, 420 (1954) (Frankfurther concurring).
"lTerminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
237 (1963) (citing with approval Terminello).
12Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Accord, Shuttlesworth v. Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
13 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). The Alabama Supreme Court's con-
struction approved by the Court recently omitted the last clause "upon such conditions or
changes in time and place and manner as would avoid disturbances." Shuttlesworth v. Birming-
ham 394 U.S. 147, 155 (1969).
14 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-590 (1935); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,
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against validity and the dose scrutiny of facts weight the balance favor-
ably for freedom of expression.
In Shuttlesworth v. Binmingham,15 the Supreme Court approved of
Birmingham's parade ordinance as interpreted by the Alabama Supreme
Court. The Court indicated that without such an interpretation, the statute
would have been unconstitutional on its face since it had granted the Com-
mission the power to withhold issuance of a permit if in its judgment "the
public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals, or con-
venience" required such action.0 The statute had conditioned petitioners
constitutional guarantees on the uncontrolled will of the Commission.
To provide the licensor with definite standards for making his deci-
sion the legislature should direct guidelines of prohibited activity. Stat-
utes limiting courthouse,17 jailhouse, 18 neighborhood, 9 and rush hour dem-
onstrations,20 loud and raucous sound amplification, 21 obstruction of
streets and sidewalks, 22 have all been approved specifically or impliedly
by the Court. Further, dicta has implied that any specific regulation of
streets and sidewalks and parks for public safety and convenience would
be found constitutional on its face.23  Difficulty erupts when vague cri-
teria are incorporated in the statute as grounds for refusal.
A license should not be denied on the grounds that the demonstra-
tion will likely cause a breach of the peace unless the applicant states
breach of the peace to be his purpose and he appears to have the capa-
bilities to carry out his intent. 4 (It is doubtful that such a potential ap-
plicant will apply.) The difference between protected speech, that
"stir[s] people to anger, invite[s] public dispute or jbrings] about a
condition of unrest '" 5 and prohibited speech that "creates a dear and
present danger of a substantive evil that arises far above public incon-
venience, annoyance, or unrest"26 is too slight to distinguish before the
322 (1951) (Black dissenting); contra, Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 287 (1951)
(Frankfurther concurring).
15 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
l6 d. at 149.
17 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
18 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
19 Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 113 (Black and Douglas concurring) (1969).
20 COX v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
21 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
22 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 553 (1965).
3 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 581 (1965) (Black concurring and dissenting). The
question of whether a municipality can totally prohibit all forms of speech on public streets or
parks is still unanswered. Compare Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 NE 113
(1895), affirmed 167 U.S. 43 (1897) with Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
24 See notes 32-33, infra.





event in question takes place. Making such a determination is difficult
enough for learned courts after the fact. The licensor's decision, based
as it must be on the hypothesized result of the interaction of many un-
known variables, is necessarily quite unreliable and discretionary. Fur-
thermore, subsequent punishment is always available "after freedom to
speak has been so grossly abused that its immunity is breached.""
Some other forms of speech are not protected by the Constitution
and thus would be proper subjects for consideration as grounds for denial
in drafting a proper licensing statute. These unprotected forms include
statements advocating incitement to riot,"' fighting words,29 and other
expressions "so interlaced with burgeoning violence that [they are] not
protected. ... 30 Fighting words, which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, were author-
itatively found outside the constitution's protection in a "face to face"
situation.3' When such words are spoken to a group the likelihood of a
breach of the peace is reduced and therefore the constitutional protections
should be revitalized.32 The remaining two previously mentioned unpro-
tected forms of speech also should not be grounds for denial of a license
unless the applicant specifically states his intent to engage in such activ-
ity since the relationship of such words to traffic control, the legitimate
goal of parade licensing, is tenuous and subsequent punishment is always
available.33
The Alabama construction, which almost saved the Birmingham statute,
limited the scope of the licensor's discretion to considerations of safety,
comfort, and convenience in the use of the streets and not to censorship.
It also made the granting of a license mandatory after an investigation
found the convenience of the public in the use of the streets or sidewalks
would not thereby be unduly disturbed. The Alabama court unexplain-
ably omitted the phrase "upon such conditions or changes in time, place,
and manner as would avoid disturbance" approved by the Court in Cox v.
27 Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180-81 (1968). Municipal officials seem to feel
this is unsatisfactory and would prefer the result in Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967)
and Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). Hoffman, Report of Committee on City Distur-
bance, NIMLO MUNI. L REV. 105, 128 (1968).
28 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
29 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). (The unanimous court in-
cluded the following as unprotected speech: lewd, obscene, profane, libelous and insulting or
fighting words).
30 Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968).
31 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942). Appellant was convicted
for saying "telling the Marshall you are a God damned Racketeer and a damned Fascist and the
whole government of Rochester are Fascists.... Id. at 569.
32 Note, Free Speech and the Hostile Audience, 26 N.Y.U. INTA L. REv. 489, 498 (1951).
33 Cf. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 301 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing).
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New Hampshire.8 4 The difference between unduly disturb and disturb-
ance may be significant. The former suggests some disturbance would
be permissible, as does the clear and present danger test, while the latter
could be interpreted to dictate changes to avoid all disturbance. The
latter construction appears to place freedom of expression on the same
footing as the public's convenience, which would invalidate the provi-
sionY5  Significantly, the Court infers that a valid statute could contain
provisions for changes in time and place which "would minimize the
traffic problems."8 6 This view recognizes that some traffic may be incon-
venienced by a demonstration. The problem here, as throughout the li-
censing procedure, is the need for non-discriminatory administration
based on specific statutory guidelines. 7
In addition to the Alabama court's construction of the statute, the
Supreme Court suggested that procedural safeguards were needed to in-
sure constitutionality.38 Justice Harlan, concurring, suggests several per-
tinent procedural queries. How should an application be submitted?
Must every applicant personally appear before the commission or is the
delivery of an application at a specified office sufficient to have the re-
quest considered? More importantly, will an applicant have effective re-
lief on denial of the license? Harlan begins the inquiry by arguing that
the Freedman v. Maryland" doctrine, relating to film obscenity cases,
which prohibits states from requiring individuals to undergo time con-
suming procedures before they could exercise their protected right of ex-
pression is applicable to parade licensing cases. "The right to assemble
peaceably to voice political protest is at least as basic as the right to ex-
hibit a motion picture.... [T]iming is of the essence of politics. '40  The
question of whether parade licenses need be administered on an expe-
dited basis was not reached in Cox v. New Hampshire4' and since appel-
lant in Poulus v. New Hampshire42 had sufficient time (almost two months)
to obtain an order of mandamus from the courts the question of rapid
remedy was likewise not discussed. Harlan suggests a required submis-
sion months before the event would place a great burden on one's con-
stitutional rights.43 Yet the submission must be made early enough to
34 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
35 See note 11 supra.
36 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 158 (1969).
37 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-
58 (1965).
38 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 155 n.4 (1969).
39 380 U.S. 51, (1965).
40 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 162-63 (1969). See note 9 supra and ap-
plicable text.
41312 U.S. 569 (1941).
42 345 U.S. 395, 419-420 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
43 Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968).
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allow time for an investigation, an administrative decision and a judicial
review regarding the issuance of the license before the date of the event.44
Assuming the application contains sufficient information on which
the licensor can base his determination, i.e., size, composition (people,
animals, vehicles), route, time, duration and date of the planned activ-
ity, a city official with knowledge of the city's traffic situation should
be able to make a decision within twenty-four hours. In the event of a
conflict a prompt discussion of alternatives (time, place or manner)
should be initiated. The discussion must be limited by time to a rela-
tively short period-perhaps a day. After this time (maximum of two
days) the issuing officer would issue one of two possible licenses. The
absolute license will be issued when the licensor believes the activity will
not unduly disturb the convenience of the public in their use of the
streets. If the licensor finds otherwise he would issue a conditional li-
cense. The conditional license would permit the activity unless a judicial
determination 5 after due notice and an adversary hearing found" the
proposed activity to be such as would unduly disturb the convenience of
the public in the use of their streets. This dual licensing scheme would
place the burden of seeking judicial review on the licensor and tend to
prevent any delaying tactics on his part. To insure that the applicant will
not delay the judicial determination, his stalling tactics (failure to ap-
pear after due notice, purposely making himself unavailable to receive
notice) should be grounds for a judicial revokation of the conditional
license.
Assuming that local courts are influenced greatly by community at-
titudes and may be less sensitive to the individuals constitutionally pro-
tected rights,4 7 rapid appellate review of the lower court's decision may be
mandatory. The conditional parade license should similarly be condi-
tioned on a determination by the appellate court since the censorship of
political expression requires greater scrutiny than censorship of alleged
obscene material.
Time limitations must also be imposed on the judicial process.48 The
hearing should closely follow (within one day) adequate notice and the
joinder of issue. The applicant's formal application can be used as his
pleading thus leaving the licensor with control of the time factor. A
44 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61 (1965); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
4 5 
"[O]nly a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final
restraint." Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1961); Manual Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 518-519 (1962).
40 Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 185 (1968).
47 Roth v. United Statss, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting);
cf. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 45 (1961) (approving a statute leaving final ap-
peal to the mayor, though this specific question was unanswered).
48 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
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rapid judicial decision should also be required by statute-perhaps two
days. Thus after one and half weeks an initial determination by the
courts could be obtained. If appellate review is also desired the licensor,
still with the burden of going forward, must quickly initiate the action.
The appellate court will also be required to decide within a specified time.
By computing the maximum time needed for the total review process, per-
haps three weeks, the proper time for submission can be determined. To
reduce the time needed for the entire project, the first judicial determina-
tion could be omitted and an appeal from the licensor taken directly to
the appellate court. This would remove what may be a duplicate decision
making of the local licensor and the local judge and would reduce the
total time needed for review by nearly a week. Throughout the proceed-
ings the burden of proof would be on the licensor to show that the con-
venience of the public would be unduly disturbed if the activity were
sanctioned.49
The Birmingham statute, litigated in Shuttlesworth, with the Alabama
Supreme Court's construction lacked the above mentioned procedural
standards but this was not the Court's grounds for reversal. The Court
distinguished the instant case from Cox v. New Hampshire,50 since in
that case there was other evidence to indicate that the statute had been
administered in a discriminatory manner,5 1 and accordingly reversed ap-
pellant's conviction for demonstrating without a permit. Had there been
no prior evidence of discriminatory licensing the decision would have
been difficult in light of the Alabama Supreme Court's construction since
the statute on its face literally gave unconstitutional discretion to the li-
censor.2 The "remarkable job of plastic surgery" performed by the Ala-
bama Supreme Court, four years after the event, would have much less
effect in situations where the statute's language is so patently discretion-
ary. 53
The Good Friday and Easter Sunday marches involved in Shuttles-
worth had previously been before the Court in Walker v. Birmingham.'t
At that time a one vote majority affirmed a finding of contempt against
petitioners who had violated an ex parte injunction which incorporated
the same statute litigated in Shuttlesworth. The Walker Court based its
49 Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
50 "There is no evidence that the statute has been administered otherwise than in the fair
and non-discriminatory manner...." 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941).
51 The court took judicial notice of uncontradicted testimony in Walker v. Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307, 317 n. 9, 325, 335, 339 (1967) which indicated that the censor thought the or-
dinance meant what it said. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 157 (1969).
52 Cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S.
395 (1953).
53 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153-56 (1969).
54 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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decision on the general rule stated in Howat v. Kansas,5 that court
injunctions are to be obeyed until error is found by normal and orderly
review procedures. Moreover, the Court felt obligated to affirm since
Alabama precedent had firmly established this rule. 6 The dissenters ob-
jected to the ex parte aspects of the injunction and relied on In re Green5 7
as precedent for reversal. In that case the Court reversed a conviction
for contempt of an order prohibiting labor picketing because petitioner
was not permitted-due to the ex parte nature of the injunction-to show
that the dispute was arguably subject to the National Labor Relations
Board and not state regulation. The majority suggests that if In re Green
is a limitation on Howat it does not control in Walker. In In re Green,
unlike the situation in Walker, the petitioners attempted to challenge the
injunction before they violated it."' Continuing this reasoning the court
strongly infers that an attempt to have the injunction dissolved or modi-
fied through judicial process would have made reversal possible.59
Walker and Shuttlesworth are consistant in that both illustrate the Court's
belief that state regulations over freedom of expression can only be ex-
ercised with judicial sanction or expeditious judicial review. In Walker
the necessary statutory standards to minimize licensor's discretion were
satisfactorily replaced by a judicial hearing. But, does the injunction pro-
cedure provide other safeguards needed in the licensing statute such as
notice, adversary hearings, speedy decisions, speedy appellate review, and
the proper placement of the burdens of proof and going forward?
A year after Walker in Carroll v. President and Commissioners of
Princess Anne60 the type of hearing required was determined. Petitioners
identified with "white supremacist" groups were served with an ex parte
order enjoining them for ten days from holding meetings in the county
"which will tend to disturb and endanger the citizens of the county."
5SHowat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922); see also United States v. United Mine
Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 293-294 (1947).
56 In affirming the conviction of members of a "White Supremacy" group who disobeyed
an injunction, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that "no person charged with [a statute's] ob-
servance under an order or decree may disregard or violate the order or decee with immunity
from a charge of contempt of court. . . ." Fields v. City of Fairfield, 273 Ala. 588, 590, 143
So.2d 177, 180 (1962), rev'd on other grounds 375 U.S. 248 (1963).
57 369 U.S. 689 (1962).
ts 338 U.S. 307, 315 & n. 6 (1967); Cf., i., at 332-33 n. 9 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) "Nor
is it clear to me why the Court regards this fact as important, unless it means to imply that the
petitioners in this case would have been free to violate the court order if they had first made a
motion to dissolve in the trial court."
59 "This case would arise in quite a different constitutional posture if the petitioners,
before disobeying the injunction, had challenged it in the Alabama courts and had
met with delay or frustration of their constitutional claims. . . . There was an in-
terim of two days between the issuance of the injunction and the Good Friday march.
The petitioners gave... no explanation of why they did not make some application to
the state court. ... Alabama procedure would have provided an expedited process of
appellate review." Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1967).
60 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
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Following the dictates of Walker, petitioners obeyed the order and ap-
plied to the courts for relief. Ten days later, after a hearing, the Circuit
Court extended the injunction for ten months. The Maryland Court of
Appeals dissolved the ten month injunction since "the period of time was
unreasonable and that it was arbitrary to assume that a dear and present
danger of civil disturbance and riot would persist for ten months."0' The
court affirmed the ten day order. As noted above the Supreme Court
found the ex parte hearing to be valid grounds for dissolution of the ten
day injunction. The Court rejected the respondent's plea that the avail-
ability of a judicial hearing within two days of issuance saved the stat-
ute. 2 The obvious fear expressed by the Court in rejecting such an argu-
ment was that local officials might wait until the last possible moment,
obtain an ex parte injunction and be assured that the planned march will
not take place with immunity to the participants.
The majority in Walker indicated that Alabama's Supreme Court Rule
47 would provide expeditious judicial review of attempts to modify or dis-
solve the ex parte injunction. 63  Justice Brennan, dissenting, suggested
that the statute "leaves the timing of full judicial consideration of the
validity of the restraint to that court's untrammeled discretion. 064  In
Carroll, petitioners, following the procedure suggested in Walker, did not
have their rights correctly defined for over two years. 5 The solution
intimated in Walker is to challenge the order in the courts. If a proper
hearing and appeal have been frustrated so that a final determination
will not be given until after the event planned, the petitioners should be
permitted to violate the order without fear of conviction for contempt.""
The Court appears to be allowing greater discretion to judges acting un-
der general equity powers by not requiring a specific timetable for actions
than to judges acting under the licensing statutes, 7 in the belief that
the former will see the need for appellate determination and make speedy
appeals possible. Furthermore the court seems to be granting the demon-
strators an alternative not available under the licensing statutes-the
right to disobey the contempt order if after a diligent attempt they failed
to procure appellate review before the planned activity. The burden of
going forward ought to be on the city officials, as on the licensor, to in-
61 Carroll v. Princess Anne, 247 Md. 126, 136, 230 A.2d 452, 457-458 (1967).
62 "ED]enial of a basic procedural right... is not excused by the availability of post-issu-
ance procedure which could not possibly serve to rescue the... meeting, but at best, could have
shortened the period in which petitioners were prevented from holding a rally." Carroll v.
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 184 (1968).
63 388 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1967).
64 Id. at 348.
65 The rally enjoined was to take place on August 7, 1966. The Supreme Courts decision
was delivered on November 19, 1968. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
66 See, note 59 and accompanying text supra.
67 See note 48 and accompanying text, supra.
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sure that petitioners have an appellate hearing before they are censored.
Any stalling tactics by the petitioners should relieve the municipality of
seeking further action." The burden of proof should also remain on the
municipality defending the injunction.69  A proper licensing statute
should eliminate the need to resort to the Walker type injunction. But
should the practice continue the court will probably require reviewing
procedure similar to effective relief now suggested in the proposed li-
censing statute.
The Court has begun to recognize the importance of time and judicial
determinations in deciding controversies involving state regulation of
freedom of expression. Walker should be read as a warning to those
tempted to flaunt the authority of the courts. Carroll and Shuttlesworth
should likewise warn municipal officials who would abuse individual's
rights that the court will protect such rights. Adversary hearings, rapid
judicial review and properly drafted statute are needed to insure that the
individual's First Amendment right to express his views are free from the
abuse of intolerant local officials.
Charles K. Ledsky
08 See text following note 46, supra.
69 See note 49 and accompanying text, supra. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 348
(1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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